

History Department Summer Independent Learning – Paper 2 – Russia, 1917-1953

This research will provide you with valuable knowledge about Russia in the late 19th and early 20th century which will allow you to confidently pick up the course for paper 2 in September.

Task 1: Research Russia's final Tsar (king) Nicholas II. What was his personality and what were his weaknesses as Tsar? Create a detailed mind map to demonstrate this.

Use the following websites and videos to assist you in your research.

Biographical information on Nicholas II



http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/nicholas_ii.shtml

http://www.orlandofiges.info/section1_OriginsoftheRussianRevolution/WasNicholasIIFitToRule.php

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nicholas-II-tsar-of-Russia>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_II_of_Russia

<https://learnodo-newtonic.com/nicholas-ii-facts>

<https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/tsar-nicholas-ii/>

Videos

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXGcE5YCiPY> – Nicholas' early years of his reign

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sS6ErQefA9w> – Tsar Nicholas II

Task 2

This chapter will allow you to understand the 1905 Revolution, which took place in Russia and almost forced Tsar Nicholas II (the Russian king) and his government out of power.

Although the Tsar survives this revolution, it is important you understand this event to understand the situation in Russia in 1917.

As you read this, makes notes on the following:

- The mistakes of the Tsar and his government
- Bloody Sunday
- Worker strikes and opposition
- Violence in countryside
- How did the Tsar survive the revolution?



On a sunny Sunday morning the long columns of protestors marched across the ice towards the centre of St Petersburg. Church bells rang and their golden domes sparkled in the sun. In the front ranks were the women and children, dressed in their Sunday best, who had been placed there to deter the soldiers from shooting. At the head of the largest column was the bearded figure of Father Gapon in a long white cassock and carrying a crucifix. Gapon had made a name for himself as a preacher in the workers' districts of the capital. He told his followers in simple terms, with arguments drawn from the Bible, that the Tsar was obliged before God to satisfy their demands if 'the people' went to him in supplication. The petition he had drawn up for the marchers to present to the Tsar began:

Sire - We, the workers and inhabitants of St Petersburg, of various estates, our wives, our children, and our aged, come to THEE, O SIRE to seek justice and protection. We are impoverished; we are oppressed, overburdened with excessive toil, contemptuously treated . . . We are suffocating in despotism and lawlessness.¹

Behind Gapon was a portrait of the Tsar and a large white banner with the words: 'Soldiers do not shoot at the people!'

Red flags, the banner of the revolutionaries, had been banned by the organizers of the march.

As the column neared the Narva Gates it was charged by a squadron of cavalry. Some of the marchers ran away but most continued to advance towards the lines of infantry, whose rifles were pointing directly at them. Two warning salvos were fired into the air, and then at close range a third volley was aimed at the unarmed crowd. People screamed and fell to the ground but the soldiers, now panicking themselves, continued to fire steadily into the mass of people. Forty people were killed and hundreds wounded as they tried to flee. Gapon was knocked down in the rush. But he got up and, staring in disbelief at the carnage around him, was heard to say: 'There is no God any longer. There is no Tsar!'²

There were bloody incidents in other parts of the city. On Palace Square a huge body of cavalry and several cannons had been posted in front of the Winter Palace to stop another group of 60,000 protestors. The guards tried to clear the crowds using whips and the flats of their sabres. But when this proved unsuccessful they took up firing positions. Seeing the rifles pointed at them, the demonstrators fell to their knees, took off their caps and crossed themselves. A bugle sounded and the firing began. When it was all over and the survivors looked around at the dead and wounded bodies on the ground there was one vital moment, the turning-point of the whole revolution, when their mood changed from disbelief to anger. 'I observed the faces around me,' recalled a Bolshevik in the crowd, 'and I detected neither fear nor panic. No, the reverend and almost prayerful expressions

were replaced by hostility and even hatred. I saw these looks of hatred and vengeance on literally every face.'

In a few seconds the popular myth of a Good Tsar – which had sustained the regime through the centuries – was suddenly destroyed. Only moments after the shooting had ceased an old man turned to a boy of fourteen and said to him, with his voice full of anger: 'Remember, son, remember and swear to repay the Tsar. You saw how much blood he spilled, did you see? Then swear, son, swear!'³

There was a wave of strikes and demonstrations against the massacres of 'Bloody Sunday', as the events of 9 January 1905 became known.* In that month alone, more than 400,000 workers downed tools across the country. It was the largest ever labour protest in Russian history. But the strikes were not really organized; their demands were formulated as they went along; and the socialist parties were still much too weak, too closely watched by the police, their main leaders in exile in Europe, to play a leading role. The workers could not bring about a revolution on their own.

It was the response of the liberal middle classes and nobility that turned the events of Bloody Sunday into a revolutionary crisis of authority for the tsarist government. Since 1903 liberal professionals and zemstvo activists

* Until February 1918 Russia adhered to the Julian (Old Style) calendar, which ran thirteen days behind the Gregorian (New Style) calendar in use in Western Europe. Dates relating to domestic events are given in the Old Style up until 31 January 1918, and in the New Style after that. Dates relating to international events are given in the New Style throughout the book.

had been campaigning for political reforms, including a demand for a national assembly. Together they had formed a Union of Liberation, whose petitions to the Tsar had influenced Gapon.

Bloody Sunday was not the first blow to the Tsar's authority. Russia's military humiliation in a war against Japan had turned a broad section of the public against him and added strength to the Union's campaign. It is hard to overestimate the shock caused in Russia as the news of reported defeats by the Japanese came in – the first time a modern European power had been beaten by an Asian people. In January 1904, the war had begun when the tsarist fleet in Manchuria was ravaged by a Japanese surprise attack. The Japanese had been angered by Russia's aggressive economic expansion in the Far East and by the implications of the Trans-Siberian Railway as it approached completion. Despite this initial setback the Russians were confident of an easy victory. Government posters portrayed the Japanese as puny little monkeys, slit-eyed and yellow-skinned, running in panic from the giant white fist of a robust Russian soldier. Swept along by the patriotic mood, liberals contended that Russia was defending European civilization against the 'yellow danger, the new hordes of Mongols armed by modern technology'. The zemstvos sprang back into action and sent medical brigades to the Manchurian Front.

Had the war been won, the regime might have been able to make political capital from this patriotic upsurge. But it was hard for the Russian military to fight a war 6,000 miles away. The biggest problem was the sheer incompetence of the High Command, which stuck rigidly to the military doctrines of the

nineteenth century and wasted thousands of Russian lives by ordering hopeless bayonet charges against well-entrenched artillery positions (a mistake it would repeat in 1914-17).

As the war went from bad to worse, the liberals turned against the government, using its bungled military campaign as a patriotic argument for political reform. Even the country's main industrialists, who had in the past relied on the state for protection, joined the chorus of criticism as they suffered from the economic dislocations of the war. So unpopular had the government become that in July 1904, when Viacheslav von Plehve, its reactionary Minister of the Interior, was blown to pieces by a terrorist bomber, there was hardly a word of public regret. In Warsaw, Plehve's murder was celebrated by crowds in the street.

Shocked by Plehve's murder, the Tsar had intended to replace him with another hardliner, but bad news from the Front and the strength of the opposition at home finally persuaded him to appoint a liberal, Prince Mirsky, who called himself a 'zemstvo man'. Encouraged by Mirsky's appointment, 103 zemstvo representatives met at a congress in St Petersburg and passed a ten-point resolution for political reform, including a legislative parliament. Convened illegally in various palaces, the congress was, in effect, the first national assembly in Russian history. People at the time compared it to the French Estates-General of 1789. Civic bodies and associations held meetings to support its resolutions. The Union of Liberation organized a series of banquets (like those in France in 1847-8) attended by the zemstvos' supporters where toasts were drunk to freedom and a constitution.

Mirsky presented the Tsar with a carefully worded digest of the zemstvo assembly's resolution in the hope of winning him over to a programme of moderate reform. It asked only for a consultative parliament (rather than a legislative one) and for zemstvo delegates to sit in the State Council, an advisory legislative body appointed by the Tsar. But even this was too much for Nicholas, who ruled out any talk of political reform as 'harmful to the people whom God has entrusted to me'. On 12 December, the Tsar issued an Imperial Manifesto promising to strengthen the rule of law, to ease restrictions on the press, and to expand the authority of the zemstvos. But it said nothing on the controversial subject of a parliamentary body. Hearing of its contents, Mirsky fell into despair. 'Everything has failed,' he said to his colleagues. 'Let us build jails.'⁴

If there is a single, repetitive theme in the history of Russia during the last decades of the old regime, it is that of the need for reform and the failure of successive governments to achieve it in the face of the Tsar's opposition. Mirsky's initiative was probably the main chance the government would have to avert a revolution. In a crisis of authority a regime's best hope of survival is to make concessions soon enough to satisfy and split off the opposition's moderate wing.

Bloody Sunday ended the Tsar's chance of keeping the political initiative. It drove the liberals to the left, creating a more radical, united opposition to the government. Educated society was outraged by the massacre. Students went on strike and turned their campuses into centres of political agitation.

By the end of February, the government had been forced to close down virtually all institutions of higher learning until the end of the academic year. Professional unions organized themselves at a national level into a Union of Unions, later joined by a Women's Union for Equality and similar unions for semi-professional groups (e.g. railway workers and employees), which gave the intelligentsia a direct link to the masses.

The protest movement quickly spread to the non-Russian borderlands. It was particularly strong in Poland, Finland, the Baltic provinces and the Caucasus, where social and political tensions were reinforced by a widespread hatred of Russian rule. In the ten Polish provinces there were more strikes in the spring and summer of 1905 than in the rest of the empire combined. In Warsaw and Łódź strikers put up barricades and clashed with the police. News of Russia's humiliating defeat by Japan was celebrated in Poland, Finland and the Baltic lands in the belief that it would bring down the government and pave the way for their own autonomy.

The mood of rebellion spread to the countryside as well. Seeing the government's weakness, the peasants took their chance and organized rent strikes against the landowners. They trespassed on the gentry's land, felled their trees and cut their hay. From the early summer, they began to launch full-scale attacks on their estates, seizing property and setting fire to the manors, forcing the landowners to flee. Witnesses spoke of the night sky lit up by the blaze of burning manors and the lines of horse-drawn carts moving along the roads, loaded with plundered property. Nearly 3,000 manors were destroyed (15 per cent of the total) during the

jacquerie of 1905–6. Most of the violence was concentrated in the central agricultural zone south of Moscow, where the largest estates were located and peasant poverty was most acute.

The local gentry appealed for help against the peasants, and the government sent in the troops. From January to October 1905 the army was deployed no fewer than 2,700 times to put down peasant uprisings, accelerating the breakdown of army discipline which had begun with the despatch of the troops to Manchuria. It was the growing threat of a mutinous revolution at home combined with the prospect of defeat abroad which forced the Tsar to sue for peace with Japan. It proved impossible – as it would again in 1917 – to conduct a foreign war in the midst of a domestic social revolution. The vast majority of the infantry were peasants, and resented being used to suppress agrarian discontent. Whole units refused to carry out orders and mutinies spread through the ranks. Even the Cossack cavalry – known to be among the Tsar's most loyal soldiers – succumbed to the mood of rebellion. And then, on 14 June, the unrest spread to the Black Sea Fleet.

The mutiny began with a piece of maggoty meat. The ship's doctor on the battleship *Potemkin* declared it was fit to eat. When the sailors complained to the captain he had their spokesman, Vakulenchuk, shot. The crew rebelled, killed seven officers and raised the red flag on the ship. The mutineers took the *Potemkin* to Odessa, where striking workers had been in a state of virtual war with the city government for the past two weeks. Surrounded by a guard of honour, Vakulenchuk's body was placed at the foot of a set of marble steps (later immortalized by Eisenstein's film)

leading from the harbour to the city. Huge crowds gathered on the harbour front, placing wreaths around the bier of the martyred revolutionary. Troops were sent in to disperse the crowd. Moving down the steps, they fired indiscriminately into the hemmed-in civilians below: 2,000 people were killed and 3,000 wounded before the firing stopped. The mutineers sailed to Constanza in Romania, where they gave up the *Potemkin* for safe refuge. In itself the mutiny had been a minor threat. But it was a major embarrassment to the government, for it showed the world that the revolution had spread to the heart of its own military machine.

With the Russian Empire on the verge of collapse, the regime responded to the crisis with its usual incompetence and obstinacy. Nicholas seemed oblivious to the dangers of the situation: while the country sank into chaos he filled his diary with trivial notes on the weather and the company at tea. His advisers told him that foreign agents had been responsible for the demonstration on Bloody Sunday. A carefully selected delegation of 'reliable' workers was summoned to his palace and lined up like children to hear a lecture from the Tsar in which he blamed the workers for allowing themselves to be deceived by 'foreign revolutionaries' but promised to 'forgive them their sins' because he believed in their 'unshakeable devotion'. When advised by his new Minister of the Interior, A. G. Bulygin, that political concessions might be needed to calm the country, Nicholas was astounded. He told the Minister: 'One would think that you are afraid a revolution will break out.' 'Your Majesty,' Bulygin replied, 'the revolution has already begun.'⁵

On 18 February 1905, Nicholas issued an Imperial Manifesto calling on the people to unite behind the throne and send in ideas for 'improvements in the government'. Bulygin was instructed to draw up proposals for a national assembly. For the next four months tens of thousands of reform petitions were sent in to the Tsar from village assemblies, army regiments, towns and factories. Like the *cahiers*, the letters of grievance during the French Revolution of 1789, they gave expression to the evolving language of democracy. But their demands were much too radical for Nicholas. Most called for a national parliament with sovereign rights of legislation, effectively establishing a constitutional monarchy, whereas the only sort of assembly which the Tsar was prepared to concede (the Bulygin Duma, presented for his signature on 6 August) was a purely consultative one (what Mirsky had proposed) elected on a limited franchise to ensure the domination of the aristocracy.

The Bulygin Duma (parliament) was too little too late: six months earlier it would have been welcomed, and might have enabled the government to regain the political initiative. But now all but the most moderate reformers found it unsatisfactory. Less than 1 per cent of St Petersburg's adult residents would qualify for the vote, while in many provincial cities the number would be even tinier. The socialist parties chose to boycott the elections and support the already growing movement of mass civil disobedience to pressure the government into making further concessions.

During 1905 the workers' strikes and protests had become increasingly organized and militant. This was partly the

result of the socialist parties' growing influence, but mainly of the workers themselves becoming more class-conscious and violent as their conflicts with employers and police became more bitter and intense.

The general strike was a classic example of a spontaneous yet disciplined uprising by the working class. It began on 20 September with a walk-out by the Moscow printers – the most educated workers – for better pay and conditions. The strikers made contact with the students (the printing works were near the university) and held a demonstration, which came under attack by the police. The workers threw stones at the police and erected barricades to defend 'their' streets. By the start of October the printers of St Petersburg and several other cities had come out in solidarity with their comrades.

Next the railway workers joined the strike. The Union of Railway Employees and Workers was affiliated to the Union of Unions, which had been discussing the idea of a general strike to further its campaign for political reform since the summer. By 10 October virtually the entire railway network had come to a halt. Millions of workers – factory, shop and transport workers, bank and office employees, hospital staff, teachers, lecturers, even the actors of the Imperial Theatre of St Petersburg – came out in support of what became a national strike against the government.

The organization of the general strike owed much to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies established in St Petersburg on 17 October. The word 'soviet' means 'council' in Russian (there was nothing particularly Communist about it until after 1917). The Petersburg Soviet was really no more than an ad hoc council of workers to direct the general strike.

It published its own newspaper, *Izvestiia*, to keep strikers informed of developments, organized a militia, distributed food supplies, and by its example inspired workers in fifty other cities to set up Soviets of their own.

The Mensheviks dominated the Petersburg Soviet. They saw it as the embodiment of their social democratic ideology to build a political movement in which the working masses would play a leading role. Trotsky (then a Menshevik) was the real force behind the Soviet. He framed its resolutions and wrote the editorials for *Izvestiia*. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, were mistrustful of working-class initiatives that were not led by their own vanguard of professional revolutionaries, and they did not play much part in the Soviet's activities. Not even Lenin, who returned from his Geneva exile in November, got to speak in the Technological Institute, where the Soviet was housed, although after 1917 a plaque was put up in the building claiming that he had. It was important for the Bolsheviks to date their foundation myth from the 'first revolution' of 1905.

The government had lost control of the capital. It could not count on the support of enough loyal troops to end the general strike and restore order in the country as a whole. Under pressure from his advisers, who feared he would lose his throne, Nicholas reluctantly agreed to sign a Manifesto, drawn up by Count Witte, granting civil liberties, cabinet government and a legislative Duma elected on a wide franchise. It was in effect the political programme of the Union of Liberation. Witte's aim was to isolate the Left by pacifying the liberals.

The Manifesto's proclamation was met with jubilation in the streets. There was a euphoric sense of national unity, a feeling that all classes might at last be brought together by this 'people's victory' – a sentiment expressed by Ilia Repin's painting *Manifesto of 17 October*. Despite the rainy weather, huge crowds assembled in front of the Winter Palace with a red banner bearing the inscription 'Freedom of Assembly' – a symbolic victory on the site of the Bloody Sunday massacre. Officers and society ladies wore red armbands and sang the 'Marseillaise' in solidarity with the workers and students. The general strike was called off.

The unity of 'the people' was illusory. For the liberal upper classes, whose interests were political, the October Manifesto was the victorious end to their struggle. It seemed to them that Russia was becoming part of the family of European nations based on constitutional liberties. Newspapers were filled with daring editorials, as the old censorship laws ceased to function. Socialist leaders returned from exile. Political parties were organized to compete in the Duma elections. Streets, squares and parks became debating grounds, as people became conscious of themselves as citizens. There was talk of a new Russia being born.

But for the workers and peasants the political concessions of the Manifesto offered no solutions to their social grievances, the eight-hour working day, respectful treatment by the employers, better pay and conditions. For them the revolution had only just begun. After October, there were renewed strikes and agrarian disturbances, which continued during 1906. Many peasants thought mistakenly that the Manifesto had given them licence to overturn the rules they

did not like. There was also a new wave of mutinies – much bigger than before – in the armed services, with 211 separate mutinies recorded in the army between late October and December.

Encouraged by these revolutionary signs, the SDs resolved to stage an armed uprising in Moscow. Lenin was keen on an action. Under Trotsky's leadership, the Petersburg Soviet was also preparing for a showdown with the government. It supported a series of militant strikes and talked about the idea of an armed revolt to assert the 'hegemony of the working class'. On 3 December its leaders were arrested on charges of preparing an armed rebellion. The Moscow SDs announced a general strike and distributed arms to the workers. Barricades went up and the streets of Moscow were turned into a battlefield between the workers and police. The Presnia district, the centre of the textile industry, became a rebel stronghold with its own revolutionary council and militia. Tsarist reinforcements were brought in. The Presnia district was bombarded. More than a thousand unarmed civilians were killed in the suppression of the uprising. During the weeks that followed the authorities launched a brutal crackdown with mass arrests and summary executions. Workers' children were rounded up in barracks and beaten by police to 'teach them a lesson'. The prisons filled up, militant workers lost their jobs, and the socialist parties were forced underground. Slowly, through terror, order in the country was restored.

The Moscow uprising was to occupy a prominent position in the Soviet cult of 1905. Its 'fallen heroes' were commemorated with a morbid veneration in 1917 and during the

Civil War, when the Bolsheviks required martyrs for their cause. The uprising had had no real chance of victory, and it failed disastrously, but that was not the point. It stood as an example of the principle that one should *act* whenever it was possible to seize power – however unlikely that possibility – because only action could change things. 'On s'engage et puis on voit!' Napoleon once said. That would be Lenin's principle in October 1917.

What were the lessons of 1905? Although the tsarist regime had been shaken, it was not brought down. The reasons are clear enough. First, the various opposition movements – the liberal urban classes and the workers, the peasants, the mutineers in the armed services, and the nationalists – had all followed their own separate rhythms and failed to combine politically. This would be different in February 1917, when the Duma and the Soviet performed a coordinating role for the revolution as a whole. Second, the armed forces remained loyal, despite the rash of mutinies, and helped the regime to stabilize itself. This too would be different in February 1917, when the traditional military had been ruined by the First World War and the crucial units of the army and the navy went over quickly to the people's side. The relatively quick cessation of hostilities against Japan was also an important factor behind the government's recovery in 1905. Things might well have turned out differently. With a longer war (or a less favourable peace than the one secured by Russia at the Treaty of Portsmouth in September) the Tsar might have lost the support of the military and patriotic classes in society. Finally, there was a fatal split within the revolutionary

camp between the political interests of the liberals and the Left's demands for radical social reforms. By issuing the October Manifesto the tsarist regime succeeded in driving a wedge between the liberals and the socialists. Never again would the Russian masses support the constitutional democratic movement as they had done between January and October 1905.

But if the tsarist regime had managed to survive the revolutionary crisis through repression and reform, its authority was undermined. People could no longer trust the Tsar. They had tasted freedom. They could not go back to the situation before 1905. And they were ready to rise up again if the regime gave up on reform.

The 'first revolution' was a formative experience for all those who lived through it. Many of the younger comrades of 1905 were the elders of 1917. They were inspired by its memory. Boris Pasternak, who was fifteen at the time, summed up its significance in his 1927 poem '1905':

This night of guns,
Put asleep
By a strike.
This night -
Was our childhood
And the youth of our teachers.⁶

In the countryside 1905 was a watershed, though nothing had strictly changed. The peasants were frustrated but not defeated in their struggle for the gentry's land. When the squires returned to their estates, they noticed a change in the younger peasants' mood. Their old deference was gone,

replaced by a sullenness in their behaviour towards their old masters. Many nobles complained of a rise in peasant crime, vandalism and 'hooliganism'. This new surliness towards the gentry was reflected in village songs, like this one from 1912:

At night I strut around,
And rich men don't get in my way.
Just let some rich guy try,
And I'll screw his head on upside-down.⁷

The peasants resented having to relinquish control of the land they had briefly taken in the 'days of freedom'. Through hostile looks and petty acts of vandalism they were letting it be known that the land was 'theirs' and that as soon as the tsarist regime was weakened once more they would again reclaim it.

The squires were not the only gentlemen who feared the lower classes more and more. The urban élites had been forced to confront the frightening reality of a violent revolution; the prospect of its erupting again - with still more violence - filled them with horror. The next revolution, it seemed clear, would not be a celebration of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It would come as a terrible storm, a violent explosion of suppressed anger and hatred from the dispossessed which would sweep away the old Imperial civilization. Here was the terrifying vision of poets such as Blok and Belyi, who portrayed Russia after 1905 as an active and unstable volcano.

In the long run the Bolsheviks were the real victors of 1905. They only emerged as a distinct movement afterwards, as Lenin, back in exile in Europe, digested the practical

lessons of the failed revolution, and the ideological and tactical divisions between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks became clear. Until 1905 the differences between the Social Democratic factions had been largely personal – Bolshevism having been defined by a personal pledge of loyalty to Lenin, and Menshevism by the rejection of any dominant leader.

In Lenin's view, three things had been made clear by 1905: the bankruptcy of the 'bourgeoisie' and its liberal parties as a political force against the power of autocracy; the immense revolutionary potential of the peasantry; and the capacity of the nationalist movements in the borderlands to undermine the empire fatally.

It was these conclusions that led him to advance the essential Bolshevik idea (a heresy for orthodox Marxists) that a 'vanguard' of the working class could seize power and carry out a socialist revolution without first having to go through a 'bourgeois-democratic revolution', so long as it formed an alliance with the peasantry and the nationalities to destroy the old regime.

Trotsky advanced a similar idea in his theory of the 'permanent revolution' which emerged from his analysis of 1905. The Russian bourgeoisie, Trotsky argued, had shown itself incapable of leading a genuinely democratic revolution. Yet its weakness made it possible for the working class to carry out a socialist revolution in backward Russia earlier than in the more advanced societies of the capitalist West, where Marxist theory had supposed that socialism would develop from the revolution's 'bourgeois democratic' phase. Trotsky thought that a workers' state in Russia would not be able to survive the organized resistance

of the capitalist states. Its survival would depend on its international development – the ability of the revolution to spread to other countries through an alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry – a permanent imperative in view of the global nature of the capitalist system. Although Trotsky was still a Menshevik, his theory already fitted better with the Bolshevism which he would espouse in 1917 than with the Marxist orthodoxy of Menshevism, which insisted that undeveloped countries such as Russia had to pass through a bourgeois-democratic phase (when political and civil rights allowed the growth of labour parties and trade unions) before it could begin a socialist revolution.

Lenin and Trotsky drew their revolutionary tactics of 1917 from the lessons they had learned from 1905. That is why, in 1920, Lenin would famously describe the 1905 revolution as the 'dress rehearsal' without which 'the revolutions of 1917 . . . would have been impossible'.⁸

In September, we will start studying Russia at the start of 1917, a year in which there were **two more** revolutions!

In order to be able to understand the problems Russia faced in 1917, it's important to understand the long-term causes, many of which had caused the 1905 Revolution. Although the Tsar survived this revolution, many of the problems which caused it remained and resurfaced again in 1917. Therefore, understanding the causes, events and outcomes of the 1905 Revolution will greatly help in understanding why the Tsar falls from power in February 1917.

Task 3 -Use the following links and the reading from Task 2, to build up an understanding of the 1905 revolution.

Write an answer to the following essay question: 'Bloody Sunday was the main cause of the 1905 Revolution'. How far do you agree with this statement?

Your answer should be around 500-words (no more than 2 sides of A4)

History of Russia - Videos

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QH9WWxLPNQ&list=PLUOc2qodFHp80tLm7W2rT0zXyMaXikeWS&index=3> – History of Russia, 1700 - 1880

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQVjH4xFrdI&list=PLUOc2qodFHp80tLm7W2rT0zXyMaXikeWS&index=6&t=0s> – History of Russia, 1881 – 1917.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSlVgtwAcRA&list=PLwGzY25TNHPBfaoOR3pXw3VyBvmXljeio&index=8> – The Romanovs. The History of the Russian Dynasty - Episode 8

Websites

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zwxv34j/revision/1>

<https://www.johndclare.net/Russ2.htm>

<https://spartacus-educational.com/RUS1905.htm>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Russia_\(1892%E2%80%931917\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Russia_(1892%E2%80%931917))

http://www.orlandofiges.info/section1_OriginsoftheRussianRevolution/TheWeaknessofSociety.php

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution-of-1905>

<https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/russia-1900-to-1939/the-1905-russian-revolution/>



Key terms:

Autocracy - a system of government in which a single person or party (the autocrat) possesses supreme and absolute power.

Bolshevik – A more radical Marxist Party led by Vladimir Lenin.

Bourgeoisie – Middle classes such as professionals and business owners.

Duma – The Russian parliament created by Nicholas II as part of his October Manifesto.

Gentry - people of good social position in society, they often owned land.

Liberals - a supporter of policies that promote social welfare, individual rights and democracy.

Marxism – The ideas of Karl Marx, including distributing wealth and land to the people.

Menshevik / Bolsheviks – Political parties which believed in the ideas of Karl Marx

Proletariat – The working classes such as people working in factories.

St. Petersburg – The capital city of Russia

Zemstvo – Institutions of local government in Russia.